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FAMILY LAW
BARBARA L. SHAPIRO*
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, major changes have swept through the practice
of family law. As a result of a flood of new and complex developments
in the law and court procedures, practicing family law has become sub-
stantially more expensive and difficult. Some of the most significant
changes include a gradual filtering of cases with family law issues into
the federal courts and passage of federal laws affecting family law;' the
rise of citizen lobby and pressure groups in response to public discussion
and dramatization of problems flowing from divorce, child abuse and
domestic violence;2 changes in traditional custodial arrangements per-
colating from the vortex of conflict over sexual roles and new family
structures; 3 the use of special family courts, conciliation courts and forns
of alternative dispute resolution as better suited to the problems found in
family law;4 a surge of malpractice suits with the consequent tightening
of practice standards and increase in paperwork;5 and the passage of new
marital property laws which incorporate traditional community property
law concepts.6 Not the least of these developments has been a wave of
new federal and state legislation which has to be studied and incorporated
into family law practice. The high national divorce rate and the resulting
erosion of the traditional nuclear two-parent family has created a mael-
*J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1978; Shareholder, Poole, Tinnin & Martin,
P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico
I. See infra notes 10, 17, 19 and 63.
2. The number of television programs and movies devoted to divorce, child abuse, incest and
domestic violence in the past three years is too long to list. The scope of child welfare litigation in
the 1980s is well reported in M. Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation
After the Warren Years, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255 (1986). The politics of child abuse is discussed at length
in P.S. EBERLE, THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE (1986).
3. J. Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 36-39 (1984).
4. J. Pearson and N. Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes; Longitudinal Eval-
uation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497 (1984); J. FOLBERG AND A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION (1984).
5. See N. Gates, Lawyer's Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 37 MERCER
L. REV. 559 (1986).
6. The 1985 Survey of American Family Law, I I FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3015 (1985) reveals that
forty-two states and the District of Columbia in 1985 provided for the equitable distribution of
property upon divorce of all property acquired during the marriage. In 1985, the American Bar
Association endorsed the Uniform Marital Property Act which introduces "shared property rights",
a concept strikingly similar to community property concepts. id. at 3021.
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Strom of social and legal problems that are being brought to the courts
and legislatures for solution.7
New Mexico has not been isolated from these trends. New Mexico has
an extremely high divorce rate, an influx of people from other states, and
an obvious exposure to what occurs nationwide in all the forms of its
communications media. In fact, New Mexico was recently celebrated in
a state newspaper as having the second highest divorce rate in the country.8
One undoubted reason for this phenomenon is that no fault grounds for
divorce have existed in New Mexico for over fifty years.9
In spite of this rising tide of change and experimentation aroused to
cope with the problems, funds necessary to implement new programs
have ebbed nationally because of a conservative political trend and a
slowing economy. The loss of funds has affected New Mexico. The federal
government has cut back or withdrawn federal funds for a number of
family related programs and has tried to shift the financial burden of
funding existing programs onto the state legislatures. For example, the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments, passed by Congress in 1984
in an effort to ease the federal government's increasing welfare rolls of
poor single-parent families, gave New Mexico agencies incentives to
collect more child support by offering the state a greater percentage of
the collected support and by making the collection of support easier.'0
However, to make this program work, New Mexico needs a computer
network to keep track of cases, payments and delinquent payors. Having
a state-wide computer system will be a significant factor in the success
of the program. Some federal grants are available as seed money, but the
program must quickly become self-supporting from the collected child
support and must operate within fairly rigorous federal guidelines."
In response to the swell of changes and in spite of the more limited
resources available from the federal government, the New Mexico leg-
islature and appellate courts have managed to cope with the tide by
enacting legislation and deciding significant issues over the past few years.
The 1985-86 year was no exception. During this year, for example, New
7. It is estimated that more than one-half of all children in the United States will have experienced
a parental divorce before they reach the age of eighteen. Paul C. Glick, Children of Divorced Parents
in Demographic Perspective, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 170, 182 (1979).
8. The Albuquerque Journal, Jan. 5, 1986, § F, at 8.
9. In the recent widely publicized book on no fault divorce, L. J. WETZMANN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION (1985), the author began by stating that when she started her research on no fault
divorce in 1970, California had instituted the first no fault divorce law in the United States. The
fact that New Mexico has had a no fault ground for divorce for fifty years appears to have escaped
her. New Mexico's statute was enacted in 1933. See Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 220, 114 P.2d
91, 97 (1941).
10. Dodson and Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New Tools for
Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984).
I. Id. at 3054, 3059.
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Mexico enacted companion legislation to the federal Child Support En-
forcement Amendments, entitled the New Mexico Support Enforcement
Act, which went into effect on July 1, 1985;12 the Uniform Parentage Act
was passed in the 1986 legislative session; 3 a new Joint Custody Act was
enacted in 1986;'" a new Adoption Act went into effect in 1985;' 5 and
changes were made in the New Mexico Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. ' 6
Additionally, appellate courts grappled with the difficult problems related
to dividing pensions and other retirement benefits stemming from the new
federal pension legislation.' 7 In 1985-1986, the Domestic Relations Di-
vision of the Second Judicial District Court entered its second year, with
its accompanying court clinic mediation program; mediation continues to
be tried as a method of resolving custody issues in other judicial districts
through court referrals to private mediators; the Eleventh and First Judicial
Districts continue to issue automatic temporary domestic orders; and the
Domestic Relations Division of the First Judicial District Court continued
operations into its third year. New Mexico groups are also working on
statewide child support guidelines, which are mandated by the federal
Child Support Enforcement Amendments. 18 To date, however, New Mex-
ico state courts and the Tenth Circuit have not addressed the issue of
whether there is federal diversity jurisdiction over domestic relations torts
arising under state tort law, a novel question which has arisen and been
decided in the courts of some other states.' 9
This survey of family law will discuss significant developments in New
Mexico family law from April 1, 1985, through April 30, 1986, against
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-4A-1 to -16 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
13. Id. at §§40-11-1 to -23.
14. Id. at §§40-4-9.1 to -20.
15. Id. at §§40-7-29 to -65.
16. Id. at §40-10-4.
17. Recent federal laws related to pensions include among others, The Retirement Equity Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1427 (effective Jan. 1, 1985); Department of Defense Author-
ization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 652 (1983) and Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2547
(1984); The Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 2071 (1980) and Civil
Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-615, 98 Stat. 3195 (1984); amend-
ments to the Railroad Retirement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-76, 97 Stat. 438 (Aug. 28, 1983); The
Uniformed Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982), amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 653 (1983) and Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2547 (1984); and The
Social Security Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §416(d) and 20 C.F.R. 404-331(a)-(e), 50 Fed. Reg. 5265
(1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §404.331(f)). The Uniformed Former Spouses Protection Act was
amended in 1986 to provide survivor's benefits for divorced spouses. Department of Defense Au-
thorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, amending 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d)(3) and adding 10 U.S.C.
§ 1448(f)(3).
18. The federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments require each state to establish statewide
child support guidelines by October 1, 1987. Dodson and Horowitz, supra note 10, at 3059.
19. Federal courts continue to assume jurisdiction over diversity actions arising out of tort claims
related to domestic relations disputes, generally claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
or custodial interference. See Rafferty v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985); Heartfield v. Heartfield,
749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
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the background of this deluge of developments and changes. The survey
will selectively discuss cases, legislation, and other relevant developments
with a view toward highlighting the changes for this period that are
significant to most practitioners.
I. JURISDICTION
This year, New Mexico appellate courts decided a number of cases
raising selected problems of jurisdiction. One case resolved a difficult
issue of first impression; another suggested an issue for future resolution.
The issue of whether a father's failure to pay child support to a mother
could be deemed a tort under the New Mexico long-arm statute was raised
by suggestion in Fox v. Fox.2" The central issue in Fox was whether a
mother who had moved from Louisiana to New Mexico with her children
could file an action for increased child support in New Mexico and serve
the father out of state. 2 The father had never lived in New Mexico.
22
The court of appeals appropriately held in Fox that New Mexico courts
had no jurisdiction over the father with respect to this issue under the
domestic relations provision of the long-arm statute. 23 The parties had
never lived married in the state and the father had insufficient minimum
contacts with the state for the courts to fairly and constitutionally assert
jurisdiction over him. 24 The parties never raised the issue of whether the
father's nonpayment of child support could be deemed a tort under the
long-arm statute." In deciding Fox, the court expressly excluded any
implication that the nonpayment of support would have the same out-
come. 26 However, it is unlikely that any tort based on nonpayment of
support under these circumstances would create long-arm jurisdiction.27
20. 103 N.M. 155, 703 P.2d 932 (Ct. App. 1985).
21. Id. at 156, 703 P.2d at 933.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 156-57, 703 P.2d at 933-34; N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (1978).
24. Fox at 156, 703 P.2d at 933.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Even if a tort claim were made, the constitutional issues would still arise under this set of
facts and bar a court from exercising jurisdiction. There are numerous cases with conflicting decisions
about whether the failure to support a child constitutes a tort within the meaning of state long-arm
statutes. See Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 708 (1977). The issue is fundamentally a matter of statutory
construction and constitutional minimum contacts based on the particular state statute and facts. It
is significant that many of the cases where a tort was found were cases where a child was conceived
and born out of wedlock in the state, and where the father had substantial contacts in the state in
addition to an alleged violation of a duty to support. However, claims of non-support involving
children in a divorce, where the divorce occurred outside of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction,
and where one parent moved into the state with the children, are frequently found not to be a tort
within the long-arm statute or constitutional objections are granted. Compare, Poindexter v. Willis,
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The application of the New Mexico Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("CCJA") to child neglect and dependency proceedings was decided in
a case of first impression, State of New Mexico ex rel. Dept. of Human
Services v. Avinger.28 In Avinger, a Texas woman had two children taken
from her care by relatives in Texas who brought the children into New
Mexico.29 Four months after the children entered the state with these
relatives, the New Mexico Department of Human Services filed an abuse
and neglect petition.3" The trial court assumed jurisdiction, issued emer-
gency temporary orders, and then held an adjudicatory hearing placing
the children in a foster home and imposing treatment plans on the mother.3'
The Texas woman had a right to custody under a prior Texas divorce
decree, and she raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction under the New
Mexico CCJA to modify the Texas decree in the neglect proceeding and
in a separate habeas corpus action which was consolidated with the neglect
proceeding.32 The trial court found there was jurisdiction to hold the
adjudicatory hearing.33
The court of appeals reversed and was affirmed by the supreme court
on the ground that the New Mexico CCJA applied to neglect and de-
pendency proceedings, and that it placed limitations on the New Mexico
court's ability to modify the Texas decree.' The New Mexico court had
to stay the action to defer to Texas until Texas assumed or refused to
assume jurisdiction.35 The court of appeals also raised on its own the
issue of the application of the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act ("PKPA") and held that the PKPA also applied to the case, but was
reversed by the supreme court which held the PKPA did not apply to
87 I11. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (paternity case where child conceived in the state, tort
of non-support found and long-arm statute applied) with Boyer v. Boyer, 73 I11. 2d 331, 383 N.E.2d
223 (1978) (cannot constitutionally apply long-arm statute where wife and children move to Illinois
from Georgia, and there is Georgia divorce decree and father continues to live in Georgia, because
there are no minimum contacts). Moreover, in view of the expanded jurisdictional provision of the
new state parentage statute, the New Mexico courts have no need to stretch the present long-arm
statute to reach such paternity cases. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
28. 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290 (1986) aff'g, 104 N.M. 355, 721 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1985).
29. Id. at 299, 720 P.2d at 294.
30. Id. at 256, 720 P.2d at 291.
31. Id.
32. id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 257, 720 P.2d at 292. One reason for the court's holding was the fact that child neglect
and dependency proceedings are expressly included in the 1983 statutory definition of a "custody
proceeding" in N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1983). In 1986, the New Mexico
Legislature deleted the reference by passing a bill drafted by the Department of Human Services.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-3(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
35. Avinger, 104 N.M. at 259, 720 P.2d at 294. The relevant statutory section is N.M. STAT.
ANN. §40-10-4 (Rept. Pamp. 1986).
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nonparents.36 The issue of the application of the PKPA has been decided
differently in recent cases from other states.
The absence of jurisdiction to modify a property division in a prior
decree of divorce was also addressed by the court of appeals in Mendoza
v. Mendoza. It is so clear that a prior decree concerning a property
division cannot be reopened unless grounds are shown under N.M.R.
Civ. Proc. 60 that the issue should normally be a matter for summary
disposition by the appellate courts. However, Mendoza also raised the
issue of how a real property settlement could be enforced and questioned
the means of resolving a conflict over joint ownership rights.39 In Men-
doza, the parties had continued to hold two parcels of land as tenants in
common after entry of a divorce decree.4 Nine years after entry of the
divorce decree, the husband had filed an enforcement action and asked
the court to sell the properties, or in the alternative, to grant one parcel
of land to him and the other to his former wife with the difference in
value paid in cash so that he could have control of his own share.4 The
trial court did so, but its decision was appealed and reversed.42
The appellate court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify
the decree in an enforcement action absent grounds under Rule 60.13 If
a partition suit had been filed, however, the court explained that the trial
court would have been vested with discretion to provide equitable rem-
36. 104 N.M. at 256-57, 720 P.2d at 291-92. Only a few appellate courts have squarely decided
the application of the PKPA to child neglect and dependency proceedings in the United States.
However, since the purpose of the PKPA is to give full faith and credit to "custody determinations"
and to prevent forum shopping, it logically should be deemed to apply to these proceedings. The
New Mexico Legislature in 1986 enacted a law deleting child neglect and dependency proceedings
from the application of the CCJA. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-3(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). Child
dependency and neglect proceedings are no longer in the definition of a "custody proceeding", and
the CCJA arguably no longer applies. One result is that New Mexico does not have to recognize
and enforce out-of-state decrees in child neglect and dependency cases. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-
14 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). Therefore, New Mexico courts may decide that out-of-state neglect or
custody decrees do not have to be given full faith and credit. The refusal to give full faith and credit
may violate the PKPA. The result will also be that if New Mexico neglect and dependency decrees
are not rendered in accordance with the PKPA, they will not be given full faith and credit by other
states. Other states may hold that federal law preempts state law on the issue. New Mexico will
again become a haven for people who are forum shopping.
37. In In Re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 147 Ariz. 584, 712 P.2d 431 (1986), the
Arizona Supreme Court squarely held that the PKPA applies to neglect and dependency proceedings
brought by a state agency in juvenile court. In Owens ex rel. Mosley v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231
(Miss. 1985), the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the PKPA to a Texas decree of a grandparent
who had terminated the parental rights of a parent, and firmly held that the PKPA was applicable
to persons who were not parents.
38. 103 N.M. 327, 706 P.2d 869 (1985).
39. Id. at 333, 706 P.2d at 875.
40. Id. at 329, 706 P.2d at 871.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 330, 706 P.2d at 872.
43. Id. at 331, 706 P.2d at 873.
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edies to resolve the conflict over ownership rights.' A partition suit
provides special remedies under the applicable statute.45 No New Mexico
case has ever decided whether a partition suit must be filed in the original
divorce in order for the court to use those remedies or procedures or
whether the divorce court in the first instance has inherent power under
the divorce statutes.' However, in Mendoza, where the decree had already
been filed and was nine years old, filing a partition suit was the correct
procedure to sort out the continuing joint property interests.47
Deciding such jurisdictional questions may often seem like a legal
technicality to the practitioner of family law. However, to a court, juris-
dictional issues are of first importance. A court would be wasting its time
if there were a substantial risk that a decision would be found void, could
be collaterally attacked or could be reviewed and reversed at any point.
Considerations of judicial economy and common sense demand that the
powers of the court must be used appropriately, effectively and efficiently.
Jurisdictional issues are therefore usually considered first by a court before
a case is decided on its merits. The practitioner should do likewise.
II. CUSTODY
Passage of a new joint custody statute was the most significant devel-
opment in the area of custody law this year." This statute was originally
proposed in a slightly different form by the New Mexico State Bar Family
Law Section after a review of existing state joint custody statutes and
input from the Bernalillo County Court Clinic, the First Judicial District
mediation program, interested judges statewide, the State Bar Family
Law Section membership, special interest groups, and the Governor's
Child Support Enforcement Commission Report. The new statute estab-
lishes a legal presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a
child, but it defines joint custody as the joint authority to make major
decisions in the child's best interest and not an equal division of time or
44. Id. at 333, 706 P.2d at 875.
45. A complex procedure is required by the partition statute that includes hiring up to three
appraisers, and, before property can be sold, the court must determine that it will be inequitable to
divide it in kind. The partition statute is N.M. STAT. ANN. §42-5-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
46. It has never been decided whether a divorce court in New Mexico has the power to partition
real property absent an independent partition suit. It is clear that a divorce court in New Mexico is
a court of equity and is empowered by N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) to divide
property. The divorce court can also characterize property and apportion it by determining the total
value of community and separate estates. Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638
(1976). Its equitable powers appear to include the sale of a piece of separate real estate and severance
of a joint tenancy. See Hughes v. Hughes, 101 N.M. 74, 678 P.2d 702 (1984). Divorce courts in
other states may not possess these powers because of more limited statutory directives.
47. 103 N.M. at 333, 706 P.2d at 875.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-9.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
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financial responsibility for the child.49 The presumption is therefore in
favor of what had previously been called joint "legal" custody. Parties
seeking joint custody are required to propose parenting plans to the court,
which set out suggested periods of physical care of the child, designation
of decisionmaking responsibilities, procedures for dispute resolution, and
methods of communicating information, transporting the child and main-
taining telephone and mail contact with the child.5°
The new statute also preserves the requirement of prior law that a party
must show a material change in circumstances in order to change a prior
custody arrangement under a prior decree or order.5 Furthermore, it sets
out additional factors for the court to consider in making an award of
joint custody; it forbids preference to one parent solely based on gender;
it gives the court the power to order mediation; it makes access to medical,
dental and school records available to both parents regardless of the
custodial arrangement; and it requires specific findings of the factual basis
for granting or denying a joint custody award.5 2 To a significant degree,
the new statute reflects existing New Mexico appellate decisions about
joint custody and clarifies the previously enacted joint custody statute by
setting out specific guidelines.
The requirement of findings in an award of joint custody is not a new
statutory provision, for example. This statutory requirement was ex-
plained under the prior joint custody statute in the recent case of Jaramillo
v. Jaramillo.53 In Jaramillo, a trial court had modified a joint custody
arrangement and awarded sole custody to the mother of a child, but had
made only a conclusory finding of fact and law that there had been a
material change in circumstances.54 The court of appeals remanded the
case to the trial court to adopt proper findings under the prior statute.55
The appellate court noted that a trial court can determine that shuffling
a child back and forth is detrimental to the child, and this determination
can be the basis for a modification from joint custody to sole custody. 56
The trial court must state its reasons under the statute, however, and
stating an ultimate conclusion is not enough.57 Jaramillo will continue
to be a guide under the new joint custody statute.
Another significant development in the area of custody this year was
a determination by the court of appeals, affirmed by the supreme court,
that the New Mexico CCJA applied to neglect and dependency proceed-
49. id. at §40-4-9.1 (L)(2) and (3).
50. Id. at § 40-4-9.1 (F).
5I. Id. at § 40-4-9.1 (A).
52. Id. at § 40-4-9.1 (C), (G), (H) and (1).
53. 103 N.M. 145, 703 P.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1985).
54. Id. at 147, 703 P.2d at 924.
55. Id. at 148, 703 P.2d at 925.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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ings in juvenile court. 8 This is an issue which has only recently been
decided in other courts around the country.59 The application of the PKPA
to such proceedings is also being tested nationwide.' Both the CCJA and
PKPA are being invoked against nonparents-guardians, grandparents,
friends, and state human services departments- who are found to violate
the purposes and principles of these laws by abducting or assisting in
abducting children in an effort to forum shop or engage in other unsavory
practices. 6 As such litigation over children has continued, the federal
courts have been stepping into these cases under the PKPA to resolve
inconsistent custody decrees of different states.62 However, federal courts
are still invoking the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction when it appears that they will in fact be making some kind
of custody determination on the merits.6 3
During this year, Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly concluded and
published their ten-year study of children of divorced parents in Orange
County, California. Their study was a follow-up on their prior five-year
study of some sixty Orange County families.' The Wallerstein and Kelly
five-year study gave strong statistical and authoritative support to joint
custody arrangements. Their conclusions about children's needs for both
parents in post-divorce relationships were a significant factor in the pres-
ervation and passage of many state joint custody statutes.65 Preliminary
58. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Avinger, 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290 (1986).
59. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court en banc recently decided that the Colorado CCJA
applied to neglect and dependency proceedings in E.P. v. District Court of Garfield County, 696
P.2d 254 (Colo. 1985).
60. See supra notes 36 and 37.
61. See, e.g., Owens ex rel. Mosley v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231 (Miss. 1985).
62. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1985); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d. Cir.
1984); McDougald v. Jensen, 596 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Fla. 1984).
63. Federal courts have traditionally invoked a "domestic relations exception" to federal diversity
jurisdiction, and have abstained from deciding such cases on their merits because domestic relations
problems are an area especially within state expertise and concern. This exception to federal juris-
diction has been tested recently when diversity cases have been brought in federal court alleging
state tort claims for damages based on such claims as custodial interference or intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising out of custody disputes. See supra note 19. In the recent case of
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 614 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ind. 1985), for example, a father tried to file an
action in federal court under the PKPA alleging custodial interference before a divorce decree had
been filed in state court, thereby attempting to bootstrap the divorce issues into a federal forum.
The federal court refused to assume jurisdiction, holding that the PKPA applied only to inconsistent
state decrees and no decree had yet been filed, and that the domestic relations exception precluded
the federal court from exercising any other potential jurisdiction. Fundamentally, the court found,
deciding the case would require the court to make a custody determination on its merits. This a
federal court will not do.
64. The results of the five-year study are found in J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP (1980).
65. The WALLERSTEIN AND KELLY five-year study was published at a time when the concept of
joint custody was being tried and tested. It confirmed what other somewhat less comprehensive
studies had indicated about the necessity of two active parents in the post-divorce lives of children.
Compare D. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979), written before the study was published
with S. Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18 FAM. L.Q. 225, 229 (1984), written
after the study was published.
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findings in the ten-year study presented disturbing conclusions about the
effect of divorce on older children.66 Final conclusions from this ten-year
study discuss the disquieting and tragic impact of divorce upon the higher
education of the children of divorced parents.67
III. CHILD SUPPORT
One critical development this past year in the area of child support law
was the tidal change in child support collection practices flowing from
the 1985 New Mexico Support Enforcement Act that went into effect on
June 14, 1985.6' Under the Support Enforcement Act, an obligor who is
in arrears the equivalent of one month's child support may be subject to
automatic wage withholding. The procedure for obtaining automatic wage
withholding is expedited and largely occurs outside court. A notice of
delinquency is filed in court and mailed to the person who is in arrears;
unless appropriate objections (which are limited) are filed in the case
within 20 days, a notice to withhold income is sent to the employer and
the obligor; and the employer is then obligated to withhold up to 50%
of the employee's net monthly income for support arrears and for future
support.69 The employer pays the withheld amounts to the payee parent
through the appropriate state agency.70 The New Mexico Child Support
Enforcement Bureau of the Department of Human Services will normally
be the agency designated to handle claims for withholding and may collect
and keep records of amounts due. They will charge a set fee for handling
cases of private persons as well as persons on state financial aid. These
cases can also be litigated by private attorneys, but one would expect the
cost of collection to be higher. There are penalties which may be assessed
against the employer if the employer fails to withhold. 7' The Act applies
to both child support and alimony, moreover, and can be used interstate
to collect support through the agencies of other states or from other states
through the New Mexico agency.
72
The Support Enforcement Act also requires expedited hearings for all
actions for enforcement, establishment and modification of child support,
which must be set within 60 days of the filing of a request for hearing.73
66. J. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Young
Children, AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY (July 1984); and Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of
a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Older Children andAdolescents, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 545-
53 (1985).
67. Wallerstein and Corbin, Father-Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and Edu-
cational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1986).
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-4A-1 to -16 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
69. Id. at §§40-4A-4 to -8.
70. Id. at § 40-4A-8(A).
71. Id. at §40-4A-11.
72. Id. at §§40-4A-2J, 40-4A-12.
73. Id. at §40-4A-13A.
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As an additional remedy, the Act provides for tax intercepts at the state
and federal levels, reporting to credit bureaus, and use of the federal
parent locator service.7" In connection with this Act, the lien act75 was
modified to state that a certified copy of a decree, when filed, is now a
lien against both the personal and real property of the obligor.76 The Act
also requires a delinquency notice to be included in every new child
support order or decree." These statutory changes intend to make the
collection of child support easier and give some financial aid to single
parent families who have been unable to collect support under existing
or new decrees.
The validity of equitable defenses to an action to collect past due child
support was decided in Brannock v. Brannock.78 In Brannock, the supreme
court held that a defense of waiver to a claim for past due support could
be raised in a child support collection proceeding and it would not nec-
essarily constitute an improper modification of past due support.79 In
Brannock, a mother had failed to collect past due support for five years,
had concealed the children from their father so that he had no knowledge
of an address to which he could mail the checks, and then had contacted
him and negotiated a modification of support with him.8" When he paid
the modified amount, however, she sued him for the original amount
under the divorce decree.' The trial court held that the defense of waiver
raised by the father applied, and its decision was affirmed on appeal.82
Whether a payor could fairly raise equitable defenses such as estoppel,
waiver and novation to collection of past due child support has taxed
New Mexico attorneys for years. Brannock confirms that such defenses
may be raised under appropriate circumstances, and it will not necessarily
be deemed an attempt to modify past due support3
The ability to collect child support through a writ of execution issued
on the original support order was also clarified in the case of Gonzales
v. Gonzales.84 In Gonzales, a writ of execution had been issued to collect
past due child support and a judicial sale held; the wife then filed a quiet
title suit and the father raised the defense that the sale was improper
because the child support order had not been reduced to a judgment for
74. Id. at §§40-4A-15 and -16.
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-15 (1978).
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
77. Id. at §40-4A-10(E). The Second Judicial District is using a rubber stamp because many
attorneys have not yet become aware of this pleading requirement.
78. 104 N.M. 416, 722 P.2d 667 (Ct. App.), aftid, 104 N.M. 385, 722 P.2d 636 (1986).
79. 104 N.M. at 385-87, 722 P.2d at 637-38.
80. Id. at 416, 722 P.2d at 667.
81. Id. at 418, 722 P.2d at 669.
82. 104 N.M. at 385, 722 P.2d at 636.
83. Id. at 386, 722 P.2d at 637.
84. 103 N.M. 157, 703 P.2d 934 (Ct. App. 1985).
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arrearages. 85 The appellate court found that a writ of execution on past
due support may issue without a supplementary judgment.8 6 However,
selling property by execution and judicial sale under the writ may require
prior notice to the delinquent payor to give him or her an opportunity to
raise defenses."
IV. ALIMONY
A critical case concerning alimony entitled Dunning v. Dunning was
decided during the survey year.8 The Dunning case concerned the proper
use of automatic escalator clauses to increase alimony, and whether a
court had the power to order them, absent an agreement of the parties.89
In this case, the former wife had been awarded alimony as a percentage
of the former husband's retirement pay by the trial court, and the husband
moved to terminate the alimony. The wife then moved for an increase.'
The trial court refused to terminate or increase the alimony, but held that
the formula that automatically increased the amount because it was a
percentage of pay could be applied to increases in the retirement pay.9
The trial court was affirmed by the court of appeals, which found that a
court could order automatic increases even without the agreement of the
parties, provided that the percentage was applied because of circumstances
that affected both parties equally, such as cost of living increases.92 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals and firmly held that a hearing
on changed circumstances had to be held in each case in order to grant
an increase in alimony unless the parties agreed otherwise.93 The supreme
court has therefore forbidden trial courts to award automatic increases of
any kind in alimony when the parties have not agreed to them.
V. PROPERTY: PENSIONS
Discovering, evaluating and dividing retirement benefits in a divorce
has become frighteningly complex because of massive changes in the law
85. Id. at 160, 703 P.2d at 937.
86. Id. at 161-62, 703 P.2d at 938-39.
87. Id. at 164-65, 703 P.2d 941-42.
88. 104 N.M. 296, 720 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 104 N.M. 295,
720 P.2d 1236 (1986).
89. Id. Prior case law appeared to sustain automatic increases in child support only when there
had been a settlement agreement between the parties. Henderson v. Lekold, 95 N.M. 288, 621 P.2d
505 (1980). See also Weaver v. Weaver, 100 N.M. 165, 667 P.2d 970 (1983).
90. Dunning, 104 N.M. at 295, 720 P.2d at 1236.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 298, 720 P.2d at 1239.
93. Id. at 296, 720 P.2d at 1237. One wonders whether cost of living increments are in fact
increases, since they ordinarily only adjust a sum for inflation. A better approach might be to argue
that awarding an automatic share of a cost of living adjustment is not an increase, but merely a
protection against an automatic decrease in the value of the award.
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in recent years.94 To make difficult matters worse, the United States
Congress has enacted tax legislation modifying the tax treatment of pen-
sions each year, so that a lawyer must consider and keep up with changes
in the tax law, as well.95 Valuing and dividing pensions is still one of the
most common areas of domestic relations malpractice.96 Given these
problems, practitioners should be alert to recognizing pension issues and
should consider consulting with an actuary or other expert when a pension
asset is involved.97 This choice would probably save the practitioner much
anguish. Understanding the annual changes in the pension law resembles
the punishment of Sisyphus, who rolled a stone up a hill only to have it
roll back down again, or the labor of killing the Hydra, which sprouted
two heads every time one was cut off. The undertaking is monumental
and endless.
It should therefore be no surprise that the New Mexico appellate courts
had to confront a number of difficult cases addressing complex issues
raised by the recent pension statutes this year. Most of the appellate
decisions concerned the division of military retirement benefits, especially
the ability to reopen old decrees to divide such benefits in light of the
passage of the Uniformed Former Spouses Protection Act.9" In Norris v.
Saueressig,9 a former spouse attempted to reopen a twenty-year old
Arizona divorce decree, on the ground that she wished to divide a pre-
94. See supra note 17.
95. Each change in the pension law has been accompanied by legislation modifying how the
pension benefits will be taxed. For example, under the Retirement Equity Act, the Internal Revenue
Code was amended to prohibit taxation of benefits under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order as
alimony; to provide for taxation of lump sum distributions; and numerous other tax changes. See
I.R.C. §§ 71, 402(a)(1), 402(e)(i)(E). A technical corrections amendment to these provisions has
been passed by Congress in the 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminating ten-year forward averaging on
lump-sum distributions.
96. There are a series of well-known malpractice cases from California involving pensions in
domestic relations cases. In Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), the failure
to claim or divide a state retirement pension was deemed malpractice, and the damages were the
value of the claim lost. The attorney had not done the basic research necessary to exercise informed
judgment on the issue. In Aloy v. Mash, 192 Cal. Rptr. 818, 144 Cal. App. 3d 768 (5th Dist. 1983),
vacated, 38 Cal. App. 3d 413, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1985), summary judgment in a malpractice case
was precluded where an issue was raised as to whether an attorney had performed a thorough,
contemporaneous research effort concerning a military pension. There are numerous other California
cases. Most recently, in Martin v. Northwest Washington Legal Services, 12 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
1344 (Wash. Sup. Ct. April 14, 1986), a failure to seek post-judgment relief under the Uniformed
Former Spouse's Protection Act by a malpractice claimant did not preclude her malpractice recovery
against an attorney who had failed to preserve her right to military retirement benefits in a 1974
divorce. The value of her recovery against the attorney was the present value of future benefits she
would have been entitled to. Id. at 1345.
97. The practitioner should be forewarned that consulting with an expert may raise the standard
of care to that of the expert. See Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714
(1979).
98. Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614, 652 (1983) and Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2492, 2547
(1984).
99. 104 N.M. 85, 717 P.2d 61 (Ct. App.), affd, 104 N.M. 76, 717 P.2d 52 (1986).
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viously undivided military pension asset. She had brought suit in 1981
to divide the pension asset, and the trial court had granted summary
judgment against her on the basis of the McCarty decision from the United
States Supreme Court which held the asset not divisible. " The trial court
reserved jurisdiction because of Congressional activity to overrule
McCarty.'°' In 1983, after passage of the new federal Act overruling
McCarty, the wife moved to reopen her case, and the trial court allowed
it and awarded her 26.9% of her former husband's military retirement
pay. 10 2 The court of appeals reversed and was affirmed by the supreme
court on the ground that under both New Mexico and Arizona law as it
existed at the time the decree was entered in 1965, military pay was not
divisible. '03 The LeClert decision holding military retirement divisible in
New Mexico was handed down in 1969 and was not retroactive, the court
explained. " Arizona courts did not hold that pensions were divisible
community property until 1977 and those decisions were not retroactive. 
05
Therefore, under existing law in 1965 the pension was not divisible.
Again, in Pacheco v. Quintana,"° a wife attempted to reopen a 1979
divorce decree and a 1973 divorce decree from the same husband on the
basis of a failure to divide an interest in a military pension in the original
decrees. However, the first divorce decree entered in 1973 contained a
broad release of claims and a catchall phrase granting to the husband
"the balance of the community property."' 0 7 The court of appeals held
that this combination of a broad release and a general catchall clause
disposed of any claim by the wife to the retirement.' 8 Applying normal
contract construction rules, the court found that there was no ambiguity
in the decree nor evidence of fraud, coercion or duress, and that the
decree was clear on its face. " Therefore, no outside evidence could be
used to contradict it, and there was no undivided asset."0 With respect
to the 1979 decree, however, there was a community interest that had
not been divided because the pension was not mentioned and there was
100. Id. at 85-86, 717 P.2d at 61-62; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). In McCarty,
the United States Supreme Court held that military pensions were indivisible separate property.
101. Norris, 104 N.M. at 86, 717 P.2d at 62.
102. Id.
103. 104 N.M. at 77, 717 P.2d at 53.
104. Id. at 78, 717 P.2d at 54; LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
105. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Guffy v. Le Chance, 127 Ariz.
140, 618 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1980); Reed v. Reed, 124 Ariz. 384, 604 P.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1979).
106. 105 N.M. 139, 730 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1985), cert quashed, 105 N.M. 94, 728 P.2d 845
(1986).
107. Id. at 140, 730 P.2d at 2.
108. Id. at 142, 730 P.2d at 4.
109. Id. at 141-42, 730 P.2d at 3-4.
110. Id. As a general rule, judgments are read and construed by the principles applied to the
interpretation of all written documents. Owen v. Burn Cons(. Co., 90 N.M. 297, 563 P.2d 91 (1977).
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no catchall clause in the decree. "' The wife was therefore entitled to a
share of military retirement benefits based on the interest accrued during
the second marriage." 2
The Pacheco case also considered an important issue of statutory con-
struction raised in recent divorce cases involving military retirement bene-
fits. Under the federal act, it has often been questioned whether parties
are required to have been married for ten years in order to have a divisible
pension." 3 The court of appeals in Pacheco correctly found that the ten-
year requirement under the federal statute was only a condition precedent
to receiving direct payments from the Secretary of Defense. "4 The pro-
vision did not impose a restriction on the divisibility of benefits under
state law.'
The issue of reopening a 1977 divorce decree that had failed to divide
a military pension and failed to divide an unvested private pension was
also addressed in Berry v. Meadows. 6 Here, there had been no mention
of either retirement plan in the decree and no "catchall" clause, and there
was some evidence of an oral agreement awarding the husband an interest
in the pensions." 7 The court of appeals held that there was an undivided
asset and that both pensions could be divided in the subsequent lawsuit. ,,"
However, defenses of applicable statutes of limitations and laches barred
division of past due installment payments with the former spouse. "'
Instead, future payments could be divided because the statute of limita-
tions ran separately with respect to each payment, and therefore, the
division of future payments with the former wife was not precluded. 20
Berry also raised a critical issue concerning the divisibility of unvested
pension benefits. The appellate court held, following the California case
of In re Marriage of Brown,'2' that unvested benefits in pensions were
divisible. '22 The plan at issue in Berry had ten-year "cliff" vesting, where
an employee was fully unvested for nine years of service and then vested
Ill. Pacheco, 105 N.M. at 142, 730 P.2d at 4.
112. Id. at 142, 730 P.2d at 4.
113. Id. at 143, 730 P.2d at 5. The federal statutory sections are 10 U.S.C. §§ 1408(c)(1) and
1408(d)(2) (1982).
114. 105 N.M. at 143, 730 P.2d at 5.
115. Id. The ten-year requirement appears in a separate section concerning direct payment by the
Secretary of Defense and compliance with court orders. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2).
116. 103 N.M. 761, 713 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1986).
117. Id. at 763, 765, 713 P.2d at 1019, 1021.
118. Id. at 765, 713 P.2d at 1021.
119. Id. at 768, 713 P.2d at 1024.
120. Id. at 769-70, 713 P.2d at 1025-26. The statute of limitations on pension payments, like
child support, is deemed to run from the date of each installment payment. Plaatje v. Plaatje, 95
N.M. 789, 626 P.2d 1286 (1981).
121. 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
122. Berry, 103 N.M. at 768, 713 P.2d at 1024.
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fully in the tenth year.'23 Given the fact that there are other forms of
contingent assets deemed to be divisible property in a divorce and that,
under the federal Retirement Equity Act, the parties may share the risk
of losing the benefits if the pension is divided on a pay as it comes in
basis, the decision of the court of appeals makes sense.' 24
Finally, the fourth case related to military retirement concerned the
divisibility of military disability pay in Austin v. Austin.'25 In Austin, the
trial court had awarded the wife 45% of the husband's military retirement
pay, and prior to retirement the husband had switched to disability pay
and failed to pay the wife under the decree. '26 The supreme court found
that disability pay could be divisible community property, even though
it was not specifically mentioned by the Uniformed Former Spouse's
Protection Act.' 27
Lastly, perhaps the most critical case decided this year about pensions
in general is Schweitzer v. Burch. 28 This case concerned a private pension
plan and had originally raised the issue of whether benefits under a
contributory pension plan could be inherited. '29 The facts were that a wife
had been awarded a share of benefits in a divorce decree from a private
contributory retirement plan, and then predeceased her former husband. '30
The pension benefits under the decree were to terminate upon his death
and not upon her death."'3 The wife's sister, who was the beneficiary of
the former wife's estate, made a claim to her share of pension benefits.'32
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the beneficiary of the estate
could inherit the benefits, but only to the extent of the deceased wife's
share of community contributions. 13 The supreme court therefore adopted
a modified terminable interest rule, following a minority of jurisdic-
tions. ,34
123. Id. at 766, 713 P.2d at 1022.
124. Note that if the parties cannot settle the issues, the court may only divide the benefits on a
pay as it comes in basis under Schweitzer v. Burch, see infra text accompanying notes 135-37.
125. 24 N.M. St. Bar. Bull. 394 (Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1985), rev'd, 103 N.M. 457, 709 P.2d 179
(1985).
126. Id.
127. Id. Disability benefits are not included in the list of benefits subject to the Act. 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(a)(4) (1982); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(2). In a lengthy argument, the court found that the failure
to expressly include disability pay in the federal act did not mean it was intended to be excluded as
divisible property under state law. Accord In re Marriage of Cullen, 145 Cal. App. 3d 424, 193
Cal. Rptr. 590 (4th Dist. 1983). Contra In re Marriage of Costo, 156 Cal. App. 3d 781, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 85 (4th Dist. 1984); Russell v. Russell, 465 So.2d 181, 183 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
128. 103 N.M. 612, 711 P.2d 889 (1986).
129. Id. at 614, 711 P.2d at 891.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 615-16, 711 P.2d at 892-93.
134. Id. In Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. App. 3d 461, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), the California court
held that an interest in an employee's pension terminated on the death of the spouse who was
receiving a share of benefits because the purpose of the pension was to provide subsistence and not
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The Schweitzer case then addressed an issue that had not been raised
by the parties concerning the power of the trial court to value a pension
and set it off with other property.'35 The court decided that unless the
parties agree otherwise, at trial, a court only has the power to divide
benefits on a pay as it comes in basis.'36 Therefore, trial courts can no
longer set the value of a pension off with other property in a divorce,
but must divide it in kind. Only a settlement agreement may provide a
property setoff. The court's holding raises some practical difficulties in
dividing small amounts of vested and unvested benefits and for plans like
the New Mexico Public Employees Retirement Act ("PERA"), which
provides no statutory procedure for the direct division of benefits between
divorced spouses. 137
VI. ADOPTION AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. The Rights of Grandparents.
One theme that reappeared this year in cases concerning adoption and
termination of parental rights was the visitation rights of grandparents.
In Christian Placement Service v. Gordon,138 a grandmother who was
administratrix of her son's estate attempted to intervene in an adoption
proceeding involving her grandchild. The child's natural parents had not
been married, the mother had consented to release her parental rights
soon after the child's birth, and a decree terminating the father's rights
had already been entered. '39 The father had then died. "0 The grandmother-
administratrix attempted to assert her son's parental rights by intervening
in the adoption, on the basis that no notice had been given to him of the
termination or adoption."' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court
property. California is in a minority of jurisdictions holding that the interest so terminates upon
death. The New Mexico decision modifies the California rule to hold that only a share of contributions
may be inherited, and not a share of the entire pension payment.
135. Schweitzer, 103 N.M. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892.
136. Id.
137. The author was recently involved in a case where there was a pension interest in a PERA
plan based upon seventeen months of service with a total of roughly $1200 in contributions. Absent
a settlement agreeing to a setoff, the court had no power to trade this interest for other property and
had to divide the future benefits with an appropriate formula. The PERA statute provides no means
of paying a division of benefits directly to a former spouse, and it has been the experience of attorneys
known to the author that the PERA agency will not honor orders dividing benefits and pay them to
a former spouse directly. The only remedy therefore is a claim against the former spouse for a small
share of the benefits, with the hope of voluntary compliance with the decree by that spouse in the
distant future. This will often occur at a time when the court has lost jurisdiction and a new lawsuit
would have to be filed to enforce the right. Contact between the spouses may be lost and the cost
of litigation may outweigh the amount at stake. A change in the PERA statute was made by the
1987 state legislature to provide for the division of benefits and direct payment. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-11-136 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
138. 102 N.M. 465, 697 P.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1985).
139. Id. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 468, 697 P.2d at 151.
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in denying the grandmother relief, holding that she had no standing to
raise the issue of lack of notice, because the right of notice was personal
to her dead son and had therefore expired with him. 42 Also, the court
found that the grandparent visitation statute granted no rights in statutory
adoption and termination proceedings. 1
43
However, where there is a stepparent adoption and no formal termi-
nation of the rights of a deceased parent, grandparents may still have a
right to visitation under Pillars v. Thompson.'44 In the Pillars case, one
parent had died, and a stepparent proceeded to adopt the child.'4 The
grandparents intervened in the adoption proceeding and invoked the
grandparent visitation statute. " The supreme court found that the grand-
parents did have standing to raise the issue, and if they could show they
met the statutory requirements, they might be able to get a visitation
order. 47 There had been no formal proceeding to terminate the rights of
the deceased parent that would invoke the exclusion under the grandparent
visitation statute. 148
B. The Adoption Act.
A significant development in the area of adoption was the new Adoption
Act which went into effect on July 1, 1985.' 4 The new Act incorporates
significant parts of the Uniform Adoption Act into state law. The pro-
cedures for undertaking an adoption have changed drastically. Now, a
home study is required by a private agency or person prior to placement,
and placement for private adoptions is somewhat restricted. 50
Also, the criteria for termination of parental rights have broadened and
appear in a new section of the Children's Code. '' Under the new ter-
mination statute, a new ground exists for termination based on the pres-
ence of the children in New Mexico without an identifiable parent and
no ability to locate the parent.'52 This provision echoes a section of the
Adoption Act, where a consent to adoption is implied where a parent has
142. id. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150.
143. Id. at 468, 697 P.2d at 151. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-7-3 to -4 (1978) (repealed 1985).
144. 103 N.M. 704, 712 P.2d 1366 (1986).
145. Id. at 705, 712 P.2d at 1367.
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-9-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
147. Pillars, 103 N.M. at 706, 712 P.2d at 1368. Any grandparent visitation privileges must be
in the best interests of the child and may not conflict with the child's education or prior established
visitation privileges. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-9-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
148. Pillars, 103 N.M. at 705, 712 P.2d at 1367.
149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-29 to -65 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
150. Id. at §40-7-34.
151. Id. at § 32-1-54.
152. A court can terminate parental rights when the minor has been left under circumstances
where the identification of the parents is unknown, the Department has searched diligently, and the
parents have not come forward to claim the child for three months. Id. at § 32-1-54(B)(2).
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left a child with others or the agency without provisions for support or
communication for periods of from three to six months.' 3
Formal written consents have new and stricter requirements, including
a provision that any consent executed within seventy-two hours of a
child's birth is invalid.'54 Consents must be signed before a judge or an
individual appointed to take consents by an agency.'55 An accounting of
disbursements of anything of value must be filed by a petitioner with the
court prior to final hearing on the adoption, moreover, so that the "buying"
of babies continues to be monitored and discouraged. The Act also pro-
vides for consolidation with other proceedings under the CCJA.'56
Under the new Act, an attorney clearly must do more to institute and
finalize a private adoption, and the cost of private adoptions under the
new Act has escalated. Attorneys should further note that termination of
parental rights does not cut off the inheritance rights of a child from its
natural parents unless the child is adopted.' 57 This provision may require
some changes in estate planning and probate procedure.
VII. PARENTAGE
A significant change this year was the passage of a new Act establishing
the parentage of children.' 58 This Act was a wholesale adoption of the
Uniform Parentage Act. It contains completely new procedures and pre-
sumptions concerning the establishment of parentage and is so different
from the prior Act that all attorneys who litigate paternity cases should
read it carefully. Among other provisions, it presumes paternity when a
child is born within thirty days after a marriage is terminated by death,
annulment, divorce or legal separation, when a man and woman attempt
to marry prior to a child's birth and the marriage is later declared invalid,
or when they marry after a child's birth and there are various indicia of
an acknowledgment of paternity. '59
One characteristic of this paternity statute is the numerous provisions
for evidentiary presumptions, burdens of proof and evidence. For ex-
ample, pretrials may be held by a master, and the rules of evidence will
not apply. "60 At the pretrial, the master or judge will make a determination
about the probability of proving paternity and recommend a settlement.
153. Three months if the child is under six years of age; six months if the child is over six. Id.
at § 40-7-36.
154. Id. at §40-7-38(B).
155. Id. at §40-7-39.
156. Id. at §40-7-47.
157. Id. at § 32-1-55(J).
158. Id. at §§40-1 I-1 to 40-11-23 (repealing §§40-5-1 to 40-5-26 (1978)).
159. Id. at §40-11-5.
160. Id. at §§40-11-10 and -11.
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If the parties do not settle, the court may order blood tests through a
court appointed expert. If the case goes to trial, evidence of paternity
may consist of specific statutory factors.' 61 However, evidence of the
mother's sexual relations with other men is not permissible unless the
mother offers it. 1
62
An innovative section of this statute is the long-arm jurisdictional
provision. A person who has sexual intercourse in New Mexico is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the New Mexico courts with
respect to determination of the paternity of a child who may have been
conceived by the act. 163 Service under this provision may be by registered
mail with a return receipt.' There is also a provision establishing the
paternity of children conceived by artificial insemination. 165
CONCLUSION
Difficult appellate issues and significant state legislation marked the
developments in New Mexico family law for this survey year. These
developments have occurred in response to the swell of changes rising
nationwide in the form of new state laws, new federal laws and new
appellate decisions. Without question, these changes reflect legal adap-
tations to the changing structure of the American family, the frequency
of divorce, the mobility of parents, the increased participation of women
in the workforce, and the poverty in many single parent families. Hope-
fully this tide of legal changes will soon peak when new family structures
become stabilized and accommodations made to their economic problems.
161. Id. at §40-11-13.
162. Id. at §40-11-14B.
163. Id. at §40-11-8B.
164. Id.
165. Id. at § 40-1 1-6.
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